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Abstract A body of work in ethics and epistemology has advanced a collectivist
view of virtues. Collectivism holds that some social groups can be subjects in
themselves which can possess attributes such as agency or responsibility. Collec-
tivism about virtues holds that virtues (and vices) are among those attributes. By
focusing on two different accounts, I argue that the collectivist virtue project has
limited prospects. On one such interpretation of institutional virtues, virtue-like
features of the social collective are explained by particular group-oriented features
of individual role-bearers that are elicited by institutional structures or goals. On
another account of groups as moral agents unbound by formal institutional con-
straints, to the extent that group characteristics meet the collectivist requirement,
they fail to stand up as virtues in the substantive sense of a character trait. These two
positions’ respective drawbacks and insights support a non-collectivist conclusion:
Where there is a substantive virtue of some social group, it consists only in certain
group-specific attitudes and motives of individuals qua members of that group. I end
by outlining some risks in adopting collectivism about virtues as an explanatory or
normative doctrine, and suggesting that we can abandon it without embracing an
equally undesirable individualism in virtue theory.
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Introduction
Suppose we were to recognize a mountain rescue team for its courage. Could we be
ascribing the virtue of courage to the team in its own right, where ‘team courage’
cannot be adequately explained just by saying things about its individual members?
A body of work in ethics and epistemology has advanced a collectivist view which
claims that in some cases we can and should make this kind of ascription (Smith
1982; Beggs 2003; Lahroodi 2007; Sandin 2007; Fricker 2010; Ziv 2012).
Collectivism1 holds that some social groups can be subjects in themselves which
can possess attributes such as agency or responsibility (French 1979; Graham 2002;
Miller and Ma¨kela¨ 2005; Isaacs 2006; Sheehy 2007). Collectivism about virtues
holds that virtues (and vices)2 are among those attributes. A commitment of the
general view is that some standardly individual attributes have collective
counterparts, and that these are similar enough to play the same role at both the
collective and individual levels. Some, for example, have argued that there are
genuine collective agents which can be held responsible, blameworthy or
praiseworthy for their actions in the same way as individual agents can.3 Likewise,
on a collectivist view, virtues of social groups must be numerically distinct from but
qualitatively akin to virtues or vices of individuals. They need to be something other
than shorthand for aggregations or effects of individuals’ character traits, but also
something like them: something more substantive than, say, metaphorical traits
which we might attribute to non-persons (‘fickle fate’, ‘the cruel sea’).
A successful defence of collectivist virtues would establish a deep similarity
between individual persons’ character traits and characteristics of certain social
groups, thus bolstering the view that there can be enduring group agents. It could
also open up possibilities for a range of virtue-centred approaches to social and
political philosophy,4 and support an evaluative shift in focus, from morally or
epistemically5 praiseworthy and blameworthy characteristics of the individual to
those of social groups. By focusing on two such defences, I will argue that the
prospects for the collectivist virtue project are severely limited. In short, one
account gives us virtue-like features that are not collectivist, while another gives us
collectivist features that are not virtues in the substantive sense. On the first account,
the purported virtues of the institutionally bound social group turn out to be best
explained by group-oriented features of individual members, albeit features that are
elicited by the goals and structures of the institutions of which they are a part. On
the second account which treats less formally bound social groups as moral agents,
to the extent that a group characteristic meets the collectivist requirement, it fails to
1 I follow Keith Graham (2002) in using the term ‘collectivism’ in this way.
2 I assume throughout that insofar as there could be collective virtues there could be collective vices.
3 See also Huebner (2011) for a defence of collective emotions.
4 Michael Slote has perhaps been the most ambitious in this respect, claiming that ‘the laws, customs, and
institutions of a given society are, as it were, the actions of that society—they reflect or express the
motives (though also the knowledge) of the social group in something like the way actions express an
agent’s motives (and knowledge)’ (Slote 2001, p. 99).
5 See Zagzebski (2008).
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stand up as a virtue in the substantive sense. These two different positions may not
exhaust the possibilities for a group virtue theory per se, but I will argue that their
respective drawbacks and insights support the following non-collectivist interpre-
tation of social group virtues. Where there is a substantive virtue of some social
group, it consists only in certain group-specific attitudes and motives of individuals
qua members of that group. In this non-collectivist sense mountain-rescue-team
courage can be possessed and evinced by team members in the specific context of
the team and its activities. But the rescue-team cannot possess a substantive virtue in
the collectivist sense, as there is no ‘team-courage’ that does not consist in
individual members’ team oriented courage. I end by considering a further risk in
adopting the collectivist virtue stance, and suggesting that we can abandon it
without embracing an equally undesirable individualism in virtue theory.
First Account: Institutional Virtues
Miranda Fricker’s collectivist account of virtues focuses on social institutions as
sets of individuals grouped and bound by institutional rules, norms or procedures. In
this context she explains how her example statement ‘the jury is fair-minded’ could
be interpreted as saying: (1) that the individual jurors are each exhibiting fair-
minded characteristics; (2) that the jury as a social collective is displaying fair-
mindedness; or (3) that the system of trial by jury is a fair one – thus referring to
procedural and formal features (Fricker 2010, p. 235).
Leaving aside (3) for now and focusing on (1) and 2), the first way of seeing
things is the summativist view, on which a group or group characteristic is the
aggregate sum of that same characteristic in individual members. Fricker states that:
Summativism does not work as a general account of group features, for there
can be cases where a group possesses a feature that few or even none of its
component individuals possess (so individual possession of the feature is not
necessary); and there can be cases where the group lacks a feature even though
it is possessed by many or even all of the component individuals (so individual
possession of the feature is not sufficient) (Fricker 2010, p. 237).
View (2) encompasses the anti-summativist view on which a group is in some sense
more (or other) than the sum of its parts.6 Fricker starts her collectivist account from
this anti-summativist position and further illustrates some different ways in which a
collective characteristic can be instantiated, using three examples.
6 Note that whilst the collectivist would agree here that a group is in some sense more (or other) than the
sum of its parts, they need not prioritize the value of the collective over the individual. As Graham notes:
‘it would be perfectly plausible to hold that a society was distinct from individuals while holding that it
was not superior, or that its superiority was at best problematic, or that it was superior in certain ways
which needed to be specified but inferior in other ways which also needed to be specified’ (Graham 2002,
p. 3).
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(i) An administrative church committee whose members, as individuals, are
open-minded about gay rights but who collectively, in the context of the
church committee, exhibit close-mindedness about gay rights.
(ii) An amateur dramatics society committee whose members, as individuals,
may not care much about the society’s prospects, but who nevertheless qua
committee members are jointly wholeheartedly committed to seeing it
survive and flourish.
(iii) A debating society whose members are each thoroughly prejudiced. As a
result of the opposition and balance of these individual prejudices, the
society as a whole displays neutrality rather than prejudice (Fricker 2010,
pp. 236–239).7
Fricker claims that the summativist view can accommodate (i). While the
individuals are each characteristically open minded, ‘close-mindedness’ is a feature
of each of them in the context of the church committee because each of them feels
under pressure to adopt a close-minded view through, for example, fear of a
‘negative reaction by powerful authorities outside the group’ (Fricker 2010, p. 237
quoting Lahroodi 2007, p. 288). By contrast (ii), says Fricker, is a counter-example
to summativism.
Here the summativist cannot respond by saying that the group feature is to be
understood as the sum of the individual features, for the individual features in
question (each member’s wholehearted commitment qua committee members)
are not found at the level of individuals considered independently from the
group, for the individuals only have that feature if they are wearing their
group-member hat. Some practical identities of individual members are thus
intrinsically group-involving, and in such cases there is no lower level of
group-independent features to which the higher-level features can be reduced.
Any attempted reduction of the group to a sum of uncommitted non-group
identified individuals would literally change the subject, and so fail (Fricker
2010, pp. 238–239).
Fricker gives (iii) as an example of a group feature that fails to mirror the
motivational and explanatory aspects of individual personal virtues (Fricker 2010,
p. 239). Each of the debating society’s members is prejudiced, but as it so happens
the combination of their biases results in overall neutrality. But Fricker cites a
requirement of virtue that the ‘good conduct [flowing from or associated with the
virtue] is performed because of the good motive or skill’. And the group’s neutrality
in this example is nothing like this. Rather, insofar as it connects to the skills or
motives of the group, it is a ‘mere accident’ (Fricker 2010, p. 239).8 It does not arise
from any kind of ‘group sensitivity to the demands of’ neutrality, as any such
sensitivity is wholly absent. ‘Neutrality’ in the debating society is an effect of the
7 Example (i) follows Lahroodi (2007, p. 288).
8 Of course the setting up of a debating society in this way may be no ‘accident’. The head of a debating
society could deliberately select a panel of prejudiced individuals, so as to achieve overall balance (if not
quite ‘neutrality’) and a lively discussion. I take Fricker’s point to be that there is no motive to neutrality
residing anywhere within that group.
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group’s members having just the opposite disposition, but virtues are traits which
exhibit the good skills or motives by which we name them virtues.
Informed by these examples, Fricker seeks to construct a model of institutional
virtue which robustly resists the reduction to an aggregation of individual
characteristics as in (i); which rules out ‘invisible hand’ cases as in (iii); and
which captures the motivational or explanatory causal condition of virtue by which
the virtuous group activity or attitude happens or arises because of the virtue, the
motive or skill.9 So Fricker goes for the ‘practical identities’ model illustrated in the
amateur dramatics society example in (ii). In doing so, Fricker adopts the notion of
joint commitment from Margaret Gilbert. For Fricker, the joint commitment can be
to certain motives (such as compassion or kindness) or to the achievement of certain
ends via skills we consider virtues in service of those ends. Joint commitment to
perform the skill, apart from any particular motive, is what matters in the latter case.
The virtue-as-skill of vigilance is exhibited via the division of labour in a night-
watch team, where each of the members guards their post (one looking east, one
looking west, and so on) quite possibly just because each of them is well trained to
do so. In this example the joint commitment is not necessarily to a motive but rather
to the end of vigilance, ‘to be construed as a sheer collective skill, with no collective
motivational implications’ (Fricker 2010, p. 243).
Fricker aims for a characterization of group virtues that works for both the
motive and skill senses of virtue, and both the non-collectivist ‘clusters of
individuals’ and the collectivist senses of ‘group’. In respect of both senses of virtue
and the first sense of group, her account is successful and informative.10 As I argue
next, however, it falls short of providing a satisfactory collectivist model for group
virtues. Thus it fails to meet what Fricker herself sees as ‘the relevant philosophical
challenge’ (Fricker 2010, p. 235).
Problems with Fricker’s Account
Fricker’s strategy for establishing group virtue in the collectivist sense is to argue
that the joint commitment to a motive or an end is a distinctly collective attribute.
There are two strands to her approach here. One of these rests on a claim of
irreducibility. Group members’ joint commitment to a motive or end can be a virtue,
even though not all or even any of them qua non-group bound individuals possess
such commitment. As a result we have, for Fricker, an irreducibly collective virtue.
Another related claim is that joint commitments are distinctly collective because the
practical identities under which members make such commitments are intrinsically
group-involving. I will take these two lines of argument in turn.
9 Groups could have valuable features that entirely lack the ‘because of’ condition. Cohesion, for
example, may be a valuable feature of a community, but also be completely motivationally or
explanatorily inert. It may be never be a feature because of which the community does anything or holds
attitudes.
10 For a different critique of Fricker’s paper see Ziv (2012).
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The Irreducibility Strategy
Fricker employs two senses of ‘individual’ in her discussion, one in which the
individual wears her group-hat and one in which she does not. The problem is that
she shows the irreducibility of a group of hat-wearers’ motives to a group of non-hat
wearers’ motives, but then takes this to show the irreducibility of the group motive
per se. To elucidate, Fricker claims that ‘[a]ny attempted reduction of the group to a
sum of uncommitted non-group identified individuals [in the non-hat wearing sense]
would literally change the subject, and so fail’ (Fricker 2010, p. 239). This is true. It
would fail precisely because it attempts to reduce the group motive to things to
which it is causally and explanatorily unrelated, namely the individuals’ non-hat
wearing and non-group oriented motives. When detached from their roles as
committee members or night guards, individuals’ indifference to their committee’s
preservation or night-watch duties is irrelevant to their group-concerning joint
commitment.
So, the group commitment cannot boil down to features of individual members
considered apart from their status as, for example, committee members. Instead, it
can rightly be analysed into the role-relevant commitments of the same individuals
in their roles qua committee members. The plausible reduction here is from the
group’s commitment to the motive or end (at the higher level) to each individual’s
commitment to the motive or end qua group member (at the lower level). As Fricker
herself explains, it is the latter, hat-wearing, role which an individual must
distinguish and adopt when making the relevant joint commitment. Each individual
may have ‘conflicting feelings and commitments but it is nonetheless clear to each
member which among their various attitudes and motivations they are obliged to
bring to bear in any given context, depending on which hat they are wearing’
(Fricker 2010, p. 238). Thus the individual amateur dramatists, or enough of them,11
each act and think under the description ‘society member’ when joining together in
commitment to their society’s preservation. And the vigilance of the night-watch
team consists in individuals, as members, committing to the end of vigilance qua
night-watch members under specific descriptions of that practical identity. In each
example it is individuals who make their group-oriented joint commitments albeit
crucially, and only, when wearing their ‘hats’ which comprise their institutional
social role and its obligations.12 The resulting joint commitment, in this way,
comprises individuals’ commitments. The amateur dramatics society’s commitment
to its preservation and the night-watch team’s vigilance are certainly valuable
features of those groups. But they fail as examples of irreducibly collective virtues.
Joint Commitment as Intrinsically Group-Involving
Fricker’s other line of defence is that group virtues, as joint commitments,
intrinsically involve distinctly social entities. When the group members together put
11 Fricker deals with the phenomena of ‘passengers’ and ‘stowaways’ as possible members who may not
actively jointly commit (Fricker 2010, pp. 240–248).
12 See Hardimon (1994).
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forth their commitments, their commitment is to something intrinsically social. The
amateur dramatists, for example, are motivated to preserve something obviously
social, namely the amateur dramatics society. ‘Society’ is intrinsic to the amateur
dramatists’ joint commitment and, for Fricker, sufficient to render that commitment
a group virtue in the collectivist sense. What pulls the ‘intrinsically group-
involving’ commitment from its membership is the intrinsically social entity of the
institution.
We should, however, be careful not to infer the collectivity of a joint
commitment from the intrinsically social quality of the thing to which it commits.
In itself, a commitment’s intrinsically involving a distinctly social entity neither
makes that commitment intrinsically social nor dissolves its basis in individuals. To
see this, we can grant that there are some social phenomena which are (a) not
analysable or explicable in terms of individual phenomena, and which are
(b) needed for a full description of some motives and actions of some individual(s).
Each member of an athletics relay team, for example, could not commit to
competing in their event without taking into account some such wholly social
phenomena. These include the concepts of ‘competitive sport’ and ‘team event’, as
well as the social institution of competitive athletics in which to compete, the relay
event and its rules and practices, and a particular team for each competitor to join.
Yet none of this dis-individuates each team member’s commitment(s) to join with a
team (or that particular team), to excel at the relay event or at sport in general, or to
run and pass the baton on to a fellow team-member, and so on. Each runner’s
commitment to instantiating team-spirit, for example, can be individuated in just this
way even if ‘team-spirit’ may itself be attributable only to ‘team’ as a collective
entity. It is in this way that Fricker’s examples of joint commitments are most
intelligible, as individuals’ commitments combining under certain group and
institutional requirements.
A defender of Fricker’s position might respond that this objection misses an
important point. Joint commitments, they might say, comprise not only a number of
individuals each committing to pursue a goal such as vigilance, but also their
committing to unify in order to do so: to further that goal together as one. They
might add that it is precisely in such concert that individuals form the plural
subject13 which can collectively bear and evince the virtue. So, the night watch
embodies the virtue of vigilance not only through each individual members’
commitment to the end of vigilance, but also by virtue of their commitment to each
other to pursue vigilance as a collective.
Granted. Still, however, the problem for collectivism persists in light of the
explanatory and motivational requirements of substantive virtues. As Fricker
persuasively argues, for vigilant activity to be an instance of virtue, the activity
would have to happen non-accidentally because of that virtue. And as I have argued,
night-watch vigilance meets the ‘because of’ condition by being a group feature to
which individual members direct—and should direct—their commitment. This
13 The term ‘plural subject’, as well as the notion of joint commitment, is adopted from Gilbert: ‘[f]or
persons A and B and psychological attribute X, A and B form a plural subject if and only if A and B are
jointly committed to X-ing as a body, or, if you like, as a single person’ (Gilbert 1994, p. 245; see also
Gilbert 1996, p. 183).
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remains the case even on the understanding that a joint commitment is not only from
each member to the same end, but also from each member to the others.
Institutionally determined night-watch obligations elicit and specify the commit-
ment to the end of team-vigilance (‘this is what we do’), while the necessity of
team-working for achieving that end requires that the commitment is a joint one
(‘this is how we do it’). The problem in accounting for this feature as a substantive
virtue and in the collectivist sense remains. For such joint commitment does not
bestow the group—the plural subject—with a virtue qua trait which explains or
motivates its conduct. Rather, as highlighted in the examples that Fricker herself
uses, the relevant group conduct arises from certain group directed and elicited
motivations of individual members. That is, group vigilance is best understood as
happening because of—in Fricker’s sense—institutionally elicited joint commit-
ments by individuals to the relevant end or motive.
To be sure, valuable—perhaps indispensable—qualities of groups such as night
watch vigilance, concern for an amateur dramatics society’s preservation, or athletic
team spirit, may be manifest only by a group to which individuals are appropriately
and jointly committed. Yet these qualities are not themselves attitudes or motives of
the group that are distinct from those of individual members, and so they are not
substantive virtues that are predicated of the group in the collectivist sense. On the
contrary they comprise, or are ‘put there’, by appropriately group-oriented
individuals. More positively then, what comes to light in Fricker’s examples is
the constitutive mutual relation between a) institutionally determined group ends
and b) group-members’ virtuous motivations given those ends. This point seems just
as important for traditional individually focused virtue theories as for group virtue
theories, and I will say a bit more about this in the final section of this paper. Next, I
turn to a very different account of the moral virtues of groups.
Second Account: Group Moral Virtues
In ‘The Idea of Group Moral Virtue’, Donald Beggs (2003) argues that some groups
are moral agents which ‘can have virtues in a primary moral sense’ (Beggs 2003,
p. 458). In contrast to Fricker’s institutional account, Beggs looks at the subject of
less formally structured associations. Reflecting on Aristotle, he sketches the
collectivist basis of his view:
[C]ollective predication of moral dispositions is how we can best understand
Aristotle’s claim […] that a polis can itself be virtuous. For Aristotle a polis is
not an aggregate or mere voluntary association of citizens, just as the hand is
not an aggregate of fingers and whatnot. Since the city is in some sense a
whole, then its acts can be morally evaluated. But crucially, once it has, in this
sense, become an agent, its acts arise from its own dispositions, and these
enable us to explain and evaluate those acts independently of the acts and
dispositions of each citizen (Beggs 2003, p. 459).
Echoing Fricker’s non-summativism, Beggs says that a property of a group is
distributively predicated just in case it is a property of individual members, whereas
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a property of a group is collectively predicated of the group without necessarily
being predicated of any member. Beggs draws this distinction in support of the idea
that a group, as an agent distinct from individual agents, can bear collectively
predicated moral virtues. For a group’s moral agency, Beggs cites ‘deliberative
practices/decision procedures’ and ‘solidarity’ as a pair of singly necessary and
jointly sufficient conditions. To take the second of his conditions first, Quoting
Larry May, Beggs describes solidarity as ‘a set of ‘‘relations which binds the […]
group together’’’ (Beggs 2003, p. 463; May 1987, p. 74), on which it is a ‘‘‘way of
being interested in what is happening to one’s fellow group members’’’ (Beggs
2003, p. 463; May 1987, p. 40). The other necessary condition for moral agency—
the presence of decision procedures and practices—is on Beggs’s account closely
analogous to a condition of deliberation in individual moral agents. Taking these
conditions together, ‘[G]roups constituted by solidarity without decision practices/
procedures are ‘‘blind’’, and groups constituted by decision practices/procedures
without solidarity are ‘‘empty’’’ (Beggs 2003, p. 463).
Beggs again turns to Aristotle for an account of how a virtue can be collectively
predicated of a group agent. In an individual agent, the inculcation of virtue as a
disposition is dependent on their repeating the action, thereby instilling the
disposition, habituating it in a way that is not forgettable in the way that, for
example, cognition of facts is. Certain groups, through internal deliberation and
practices, have a close analogue to individuals in what, following Bordieu, Beggs
identifies as habitus. Where for Aristotle the individual’s disposition, hexis, is
developed by the individual repeatedly practising, habitus is a public system of
practices, ‘principles which generate and organize practices and representations that
can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious
aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain
them’ (Beggs 2003, p. 465; Bourdieu 1990, p. 53). ‘Practice’ is here understood here
not as individual acts of practising, which are ‘properly predicated of individuals’
but instead as ‘the social grammars (the types) that an individual agent’s actions
manifest (the tokens) through their own styles, their own inflections’. The analogue
then, is that ‘disposition is to individual as practice [in the ‘type’ sense] is to group’
(Beggs 2003, p. 466). Practices, so understood, are the group analogues to
individual dispositions. Accordingly for Beggs, group virtues need not be connected
to any aims external to the group agent, as ‘some groups do not have defined goals
but may still have moral virtues, and still others may have virtues independently of
the goals they may have’ (Beggs 2003, p. 467).14
How might all this play out in an example of a social group? An informal
‘quilting group’ of elderly middle class women regularly does charity work but is
not a charitable organization as such. It develops the collective civic virtue of
‘radical tolerance’, by which the group decides collectively to raise funds for inner
city AIDS sufferers in the following way:
14 This condition appears to be a corollary of the kind of solidarity Beggs sees as necessary for group
moral agency. This kind of solidarity is, for Beggs, inward looking and not outward looking, consisting in
mutual recognition of each other as fellow group members rather than, for example, the instrumental
solidarity that Trade Union comrades might have for the sake of a successful strike or for the wider
interests of the working class.
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[The group] could have decided to try to help people much more like the
group’s members, say, at the expensive hospice just outside of town. But it
didn’t. Perhaps under the influence of such factors as famous personalities and
Oscar night red ribbons, it came to the conclusion that helping people quite
different from its members would be more satisfying than helping people
rather more like its members. Now, say that this complex of supportive actions
was successful and came to be repeated. Say it became a normal part of the
group’s functioning without ever becoming politicized, that is, without
explicitly orienting its actions and attitudes toward ongoing policy issues. This
then would count, I think, as the group’s moral virtue of radical tolerance. And
it can remain true that none of the members has acquired the sentiments that
would sufficiently incline her to such actions; no member of the group has that
virtue (Beggs 2003, p. 468).
The group has remained a number of elderly middle class women that gives to
charity whilst undergoing a change in its moral character as a group moral agent. It
has, in this example, done so wholly independently of the moral character or
attitudes of its members. It has acquired the virtue of radical tolerance without any
member of the group themselves acquiring or evincing any such disposition. Indeed
it has done this without anyone having directed any actions or attitudes towards a
policy, purpose or sentiment related to radical tolerance. This then, is collective and
non-individual predication of a group virtue par excellence.
I will argue in the next sub-section that such collectively predicated group
features fail as candidates for substantive virtues. Beforehand, it is worth getting
clear about the heavy work that collective predication is doing in Beggs’s account.
In the example, Beggs articulates conditions under which a virtue arises from a
group of individuals none of whom possesses or is aware of it. Clearly, for Beggs,
this exclusively collective, non-distributive, predication of a virtue is sufficient for
its status as group virtue. But it is also necessary for distinguishing Beggs’s
particular view of group virtues as collectivist par excellence. The weight of
exclusively collective predication is in it purportedly instantiating a virtue in the
group as an entity in its own right, without having to locate that virtue in
individuals. As such it is the very basis on which the group feature such as radical
tolerance can really be numerically distinct from any similar motives, sentiments,
considerations or attitudes, of the group’s members. It is precisely how ‘acts’ of a
group agent such as the Polis can supposedly ‘arise from its own dispositions
[which] enable us to explain and evaluate those acts independently of the acts and
dispositions of each citizen’. Consider the difficulty of coherently defending
collectivism about virtues without this bulwark of exclusively collective predica-
tion. To accommodate causally relevant contributions of individuals would at least
seriously risk muddying the collectivist waters, if not undermining the position
entirely.15
15 Narveson (2001) makes this point generally about genuinely irreducible features’ immunity to
individual predication in relation to collective responsibility.
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Problems with Beggs’s Account
To test the plausibility of collectively predicated features as virtues, I start with a
commonplace (though as we will see, contestable) view about virtues of character.
That view holds that in order to be a substantive virtue (or vice) of character, the
value (or lack of value) of a character trait must sometimes, in some way, figure in
the deliberation and attitudes of the agent who has, or aspires to have, that character.
This is to posit only some minimal conditions for virtue, comprising the agent’s
(defeasible) capacity to reflect on the value of that virtue and consider reasons for
inculcating it. Jane may think that tolerance is a virtue and that therefore she has
reason to develop a tolerant disposition and, where possible, act tolerantly. But she
could also just reflect approvingly on her own tolerant conduct without individ-
uating a disposition to tolerance or naming it as a virtue. One can just come to
realise that in acting a certain way one acts well and is praiseworthy, and that in
doing so one is developing or affirming oneself as a good or improving person.
Similarly we may recognize some of our own traits as vices, or as things about
ourselves we disvalue or regret and so want to expunge or curb. Insofar as we think
that a virtue is a valuable disposition worthy of development and praise, we think
there is good reason for an aspiring good person to consider it as such in self-
reflection. To the extent that we hold moral persons as capable of moral or epistemic
self-development, we think that agents can and should value and promote certain
traits and extirpate others. This idea is an important, perhaps indispensable, part of
the putative concepts of virtue and vice.
If it is true that some such capability for evaluative reflection is necessary for a
substantive virtue of character, then Beggs’s account needs to provide some account
of that capability in his group agent. As we have seen, Beggs is careful to make
certain group features analogous to the reflective capacities of individual agents.
The public system of decision procedures and practices—habitus—is analogous to
hexis in individuals. Practices here are structural features of the group, as its ‘social
grammars’ and habituated interactions. For Beggs, it is these quasi-psychological
structures that can instantiate a socio-political virtue such as radical tolerance
without the virtue figuring in the psychologies of, or interactions between,
individual practisers. Particular interactions may be motivated by individuals’
desires for satisfaction or be influenced by Oscar night celebrations. Yet the
practices and procedures arising from these interactions emerge as something else,
namely collectively predicated radical tolerance. Here then, is what might seem to
be an account of just such a reflective capability in the group agent.
Yet it is difficult to see how the group agent could deliberate about or reflect on
the value of radical tolerance, or how its value could figure in the group agent’s
motives and attitudes. For in Beggs’s scenario, neither radical tolerance nor its value
are objects of reflection at all. The ‘complex of [individuals’] supportive actions’
over time forms part of what the collective tends to do as a practice, and in this
sense the group can be said to have developed a tendency to radical tolerance. As a
group agent, however, it does not appear to have the capacity to evaluate that
tendency and enhance that tendency because of its value. Practices do not
themselves reflectively evaluate on anything, let alone possess motives or values.
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Only agents do or possess these kinds of things. But as candidates for which agent is
to reflect on, value, and incorporate radical tolerance, Beggs rules out individuals,
yet fails to show how the group-agent is capable of doing so independently of those
individuals. Beggs’s account, then, is implausible to the extent that it falls short of
meeting the reflective evaluation condition.
A proponent of Beggs’s position could, however, deny that this condition is
necessary for virtue. A direct strategy here would be for them to adopt the
instrumentalist view of virtue defended by Julia Driver (2001). On this view a trait
is valuable, and thus a virtue, when and because it tends to have good effects. As
what matters for the instrumentalist is just ‘the external state of affairs or the
consequences produced by the character traits’(Driver 2001, p. 49), no such agent
internal reflection on or sensitivity to the value of such traits are necessary for their
status as virtues. If Beggs’s collectivism about group agents were allied with
Driver’s instrumentalism about virtues, the quilting group’s radical tolerance would
be a virtue solely because of its likely valuable effects in the world. Radical
tolerance, for example, would most plausibly tend to effect social justice, and this
would be true regardless of anything about the inner world of the group agent. The
virtue’s value is just what it tends to do, so to speak.
With the instrumentalist modification, then, Begg’s collectivism can avoid the
demand for reflective evaluation in his group agent. This modified position,
however, raises its own problem. To explain, and argue that it supports a rejection of
collectivism, I will consider two claims. The first is that a virtue’s value provides
good prima facie reasons for it to be actively cultivated. In the present
instrumentalist context, if tolerance is valuable because of its effects, then there
are such good reasons for tolerance to be nurtured and sustained in pursuit of
producing those effects. The second claim, in the group context, is that in order best
to nurture and sustain some valuable group feature, at least some individual group
members should see, and be moved to act on, those reasons.
The first claim is particularly difficult for the instrumentalist about virtue to
reject. If someone holds that a trait is a virtue because it is an instrument to valuable
effects in the world, then it would seem incoherent for them to deny that we have
good reasons to look after and develop that instrument. Those reasons appear no less
pertinent for the instrumentalist about virtues who wants also to be a collectivist.
Many kinds of social groups tend to have more significant effects in the world than
most of us do qua individuals. The second claim could more easily be rejected by
the collectivist. For it is conceivable that some instrumentally valuable group
feature could be cultivated in a group without its coming to figure in any individual
member’s intentions or attitudes. Radical tolerance could be nurtured intentionally
by agents outside of the quilting group. Alternatively or also, it could just develop
without the direct or intentional involvement of any agents, but under wider social
influences such as prevailing economic or political conditions, for example. Some
pattern of radically tolerant activity or behaviour could, in these ways, develop in
the group without the conscious influence of any group member. Here we could
have the development of an enduring, collectively predicated and instrumentally
valuable group feature. Seemingly, it could therefore count as a group virtue.
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At this point, though, the role of the group agent becomes so diminished as to
become indiscernible. Beggs rightly characterises what I have called a substantive
virtue—a trait of character—as something that has to be rooted in agency, hence the
need in his account to establish a group moral agent (Beggs 2003, pp. 462–463).
However we might value a virtue, it seems part of our concept of a character trait,
rather than a tick or compulsion, that it becomes a disposition in favour of acting
intentionally for certain reasons and not others.16 Substantive virtues thus require
agency. And the real problem with an instrumentally valuable group feature is that it
has no need for agency. Where a group can have some such feature, neither its
presence nor its development requires the prior presence or instantiation of a
collective agent. Agents external to the group’s members, for example, could
cultivate instrumentally and politically valuable group features, where this might
mean promoting deliberative procedures and practices that best instantiate those
features. Here, though, those structural features of the group, which Beggs sees as
part of the group’s agency, could just themselves be purely instrumental in
manifesting the valuable effects of group activity. This seems perfectly conceivable
without first finding, or building into the picture, the group agency that is needed to
bear a substantive virtue. Such features thus seem unlikely candidates as collective
substantive virtues that can only properly be predicated of agents. With the
instrumentalist modification, collectivism can avoid the demands of reflective
evaluation, but at the cost of making the collective agent—the supposed possessor
of the genuine group virtue—all but redundant.
The instrumentalist take also raises a normative question for collectivism about
virtues. If a group feature is instrumentally valuable, then we should ask how best to
look after and wield the instrument so as to effect its value. In answer to which there
would seem no good reason to maintain the collectivist view. Beggs himself
expresses the hope that ‘virtue ethics can escape its thraldom to the soul—in the
figure of the person’ (Beggs 2003, p. 458) and adds the promissory claim that
‘[g]roup virtues are a distinctive yet heretofore unrecognized form which, through
intermediate associations, moral agents can collectively develop and act on
conceptions of the good while preserving pluralism and developing civil society’
(Beggs 2003, p. 470). Yet, if a group virtue ethics or political theory is to be applied
in this way, then which agents are to recognize and develop these virtues? How
would group virtues best be propagated within or beyond their subject groups, if not
by involving at least some individual members’ acquisition or conscious cultivation
of that virtue? Why not drop the collectivist constraint, and allow that (at least some
of) the individual agents within the relevant group would be among those best
placed intentionally to advance these virtues and their effects?
In response to this clutch of rhetorical questions, if some valuable feature is to be
developed in a group then there appear to be no grounds on which to deny that
individual agents—including relevant group members—should do the developing.
Individuals in those groups would seem well placed to do this, by their actions and
their advancing arguments about which of their group’s features should be deemed
16 Notice that some quite strong, valuable and reliable dispositions of some kind can of course be
developed in some putative non-rational beings, as for example when handlers train rescue or guide dogs.
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virtues or vices and why; about how these virtues should be developed and
encouraged; or about the extent to which group activities would be right or wrong
by virtue of their manifesting virtue or vice, and so on.
Beggs’s account shows ways in which groups can possess some features
collectively. But it faces difficulties with establishing substantive group virtues on
this basis. The group appears to lack a reflective and self-evaluative capacity that is,
on one common view, needed for virtue. Alternatively, the group without this
capacity can possess a valuable feature, but in that case can do without the agency
required for substantive virtue. Insofar as some group feature can be genuinely
collective, possessed by the group in its own right, it has little conceptual or
normative traction as a substantive virtue.
Conclusions: Towards a Non-collectivist Account of Social Group
Virtues
I contend that the limitations of both the collectivist accounts discussed support a
different, non-collectivist interpretation of social groups and virtues, as do some of
their positive insights.
To see this, let us first return to Fricker’s third way of speaking of
institutionalized groups, which earlier I left aside. In this manner of speaking,
virtues are strengths of social institutions rather than virtues of character. Virtues in
this sense are such things as rules, practices or procedures which could endure
regardless of which particular individuals are part of the group at any time (Fricker
2010, p. 236). Fricker’s insight here is in identifying this constitutive relation
between, on one hand, structural group strengths and, on the other hand, group-
specific motives and attitudes of individual agents qua members. Group strengths
serve as essential criteria for the appropriate exhibition of virtue by their individual
constituents qua members (Swanton 2007). The problem is with Fricker running the
two distinct phenomena together and mischaracterising the combination as an
instance of collectivist virtue. Aspects of Beggs’s account underpin the non-
collectivist interpretation in a similar way. His practices and social grammars, as
group habitus, are also institutional in the sense of being socially instituted
structures, procedures or norms. The main problems in Beggs’s view are with his
first making these structural group features quasi-psychological features of the
group agent, and then trying to show that this group agent can itself sustain a
substantive virtue independently of individual members’ motives or attitudes.
Taking into account these insights and problems, an alternative non-collectivist
view can recognize the value of social structural features, as can the collectivist
view. Unlike collectivism, it distinguishes these features from group-specific virtues
which are properties of individual members. It also recognizes the constitutive
relation between those social features and those virtues, without problematically
seeking to run the two together. Different kinds of groups can have variously
valuable features which serve as criteria for what counts as appropriate group-
specific virtuous motives and actions. Some groups may have specific valuable
functions by dint of which the virtuous motive will be to fulfil that function (night
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watch vigilance). Some valuable features of other groups may not be linked directly
to a specified or primary function, but nonetheless be beneficial to the group qua
that kind of group (relay team-spirit). Others may not be linked to group functions at
all but nonetheless be socially beneficial, giving us good reasons to nurture them in
that group (quilting group radical tolerance). And others still may be valuable in
more than one, or all, of these ways (mountain rescue-team courage). In each of
these cases, valuable group features can serve to elicit group-specific social virtues:
appropriately group oriented attitudes, motives and actions of group members. This,
it seems to me, is the right way of understanding virtues in the context of social
groups, and it could work better than the collectivist view in a socially enriched
normative virtue theory. If we are to formulate a virtue theory that can tell us
something about which practices, conduct or policies can and should be instantiated
in groups and manifest in the world, we should forget about trying to establish
collective substantive virtues. Instead, we would do better to look at which features
a particular kind of group should have, and at which relevant motives and attitudes
an individual should possess qua member of that group. Just as importantly, we
should study the ways in which these things interact with each other.
For all this, it might be said that the concept of collective virtue could still
usefully figure in good explanations of certain social phenomena, and in normative
theories of social groups. So, even if it is false or highly unlikely that groups can
literally possess virtues, the collectivist view could provide a useful methodological
model for looking at certain kind of group behaviours, or at group contextual norms,
and the social dimensions of individual’s virtues and vices, for example. I suggest,
in response, that we have further reason to be cautious about adopting the
collectivist point of view in this way.
The dangers with adopting the collectivist position might be best exemplified by
a case of a group vice. Suppose that a certain group of individuals is charged with
having sexist tendencies. In order to assess this claim and, if true, to begin
eradicating the sexism, we would ask how sexism is present in the group and how it
tends to be manifest. Digging further down, we would rightly ask which aspects of
the group’s sexism are properly attributable to particular members, past or present,
and which to its structural features. If we were to find examples of the latter, such as
sexist rules, conventions, cultures or practices, then we may need to establish which
if any have preceded and survived particular members, and which if any are
promulgated by a particular cohort of current (perhaps especially influential)
members. Supposing now that some members have at some point instantiated or
sustained sexist structures, it may then be important to find, where possible, whether
any member(s) actively seek(s) to perpetuate sexist structures. By contrast there
may be some who resist and challenge sexist structures or the sexist attitudes of its
members (and may thereby be rightly deemed anti-sexist, perhaps even coura-
geously so in the face of peer pressure). Other group members may tacitly
encourage or condone sexism by turning a blind eye. Of those members we can ask
whether their acquiescence is only or mostly under the influence of sexist group
structures and whether some members harbour sexist attitudes prior to the group
context. Such attitudes may explain and motivate blind-eye turning, and they may
play a part in upholding sexist structures.
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The list could go on, and its being non-exhaustive underlines both the complex
relation of individual and group features and the anti-collectivist point of the
example. As we have seen, the bite of the collectivist view is that there can be
virtues and vices of groups which are attributable, as traits, to the group as a whole
and in its own right. I have argued that collectivism about virtues is unsuccessful
because, in essence, it too readily elides social structural phenomena and personal
traits. That conclusion, if true, would seem true of virtue collectivism whichever
way it is employed. Approaching the complex sources and loci of the group’s
sexism using a collectivist model would appear to bring no more explanatory or
normative power than a non-collectivist approach. More perniciously it would bring
risks of descriptive and prescriptive failure due to blurring things that are to be
explained or justified. One risk is of misattributing agent traits such as sexism to
non-agents. Another is lumping together individual and super-individual phenom-
ena which need to be separated in order to identify, judge and—we might hope—
ultimately quash the group’s sexism.
The sexism example illustrates a fear that through a collectivist virtue lens we
might struggle to see the trees for the wood. This should not, however, lead us to
favour an individualist focus on virtues that struggles to see the wood for the trees.
In assessing and ultimately rejecting the collectivist position on group virtues, I
hope to have shown that there are valuable (or dis-valuable) features of social
groups which figure appropriately in the individual’s practical reasoning and
virtuous motivations qua member of that group. Theorists of individuals’ virtues
should heed this lesson to the extent that their theories must accommodate the
obligations and norms of social roles (Oakley and Cocking 2001; MacIntyre 2006;
Hursthouse 2007; Swanton 2007). That is surely a significant extent, for such
obligations and norms are born by individuals but determined by social institutions
(Dahrendorf 1970).
Finally, I suggest that this last point generalizes beyond virtue theory. We need
not clamour towards prioritizing either social or individual phenomena when first
seeking to explain the co-existence of both. As part of a persuasive interpretation of
Hegel’s social philosophy, Kenneth Westphal has summed up the general point,
which anyone tempted in either direction would do well to consider:
There are no individuals – no social practitioners – without social practices,
and vice versa, there are no social practices without social practitioners, that
is, without individuals who learn, participate in, perpetuate, and who modify
social practices as needed to meet their changing needs, aims, and
circumstances (including procedures and information). [I]ndividual human
beings and the social groups to which they belong are mutually interdependent
for their existence and characteristics (Westphal 2010, pp. 168–169).
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